Usable, secure email remains an open problem. Recent research compared two separate secure email systems that support manual and automatic encryption, respectively. The system supporting manual encryption helped users better understand secure email and avoid mistakes. However, the use of two distinct systems casts doubt on whether the improvements can indeed be attributed to manual encryption. In this paper, we report on the results of a formal user study comparing two versions of Private WebMail (Pwm) that differ only in their support for manual and automatic encryption. Our results demonstrate that manual encryption and automatic encryption perform equally well in terms of usability, users' understanding of secure email, and users' ability to avoid mistakes. Furthermore, both versions achieve the highest System Usability Scale (SUS) score ever recorded for a secure email tool.
INTRODUCTION
Usable, secure email is still an open problem more than 15 years after Whitten and Tygar's seminal paper, Why Johnny Can't Encrypt [16] . In a recent book, Garfinkel and Lipford summarize the work on secure email and identify a key open problem in this area: whether automatic encryption improves the usability of encrypted email or messaging systems [7] . Here, automatic encryption refers to both hiding the key management details that proved to be so problematic in the Whitten and Tygar's study, as well as hiding ciphertext from end users. The alternative approach discussed by Garfinkel and Lipford is manual encryption, which differs from automatic encryption in that users are shown ciphertext to help them understand that encryption has occurred.
Two recent studies on this issue contain mixed results. A study by Fahl et al. [6] examined manual and automatic encryption for Facebook messaging and found that both manual and automatic message encryption fared equally well in terms of usability; however, they did not explore how the systems affected users' understanding of what had occurred. A study by Ruoti et al. [11] compared Private WebMail (Pwm), an automatic encryption system tightly integrated with Gmail in the browser, with MP, a manual encryption system that operates as a stand-alone desktop application and requires users to cut-and-paste ciphertext into their email. During a laboratory user study, participants using MP's manual encryption made fewer mistakes and answered more questions correctly on a quiz that tested their understanding of the system. However, the results of the Ruoti study are inconclusive because there are significant differences between Pwm and MP that introduce confounding factors, thus raising doubt about the conclusions drawn from the better scores seen with MP.
In this work, we formally test three hypotheses regarding automatic and manual encryption: automatic and manual encryption differ in their usability, manual encryption does better than automatic encryption at helping users understand secure email, and manual encryption does better than automatic encrypt at helping users avoid mistakes. To test these hypotheses, we created a modified version of Ruoti et al. ' s Pwm system that incorporated new features that address issues encountered in their user studies. We then created two versions of Pwm that differ only in their support for automatic and manual encryption. This provides a stronger basis to test our hypotheses by conducting an A/B test using the two versions. We evaluate the hypotheses based on usability scores derived via the System Usability Scale (SUS), a questionnaire that assesses user understanding, and quantitative measures of how often users sent sensitive information without encryption.
Our results demonstrate that manual encryption does not have a significant effect on usability, users' understanding of secure email, or users' ability to avoid mistakes. In addition, our improved version of the Private WebMail system scores an 80.0 on the System Usabil-ity Scale (SUS), rating in the "excellent" category for usability and receiving an "A" grade. This score is in the 85 th to 90 th percentile of a large number of systems tested with SUS [12] and is the highest reported SUS score for secure email in the literature.
RELATED WORK
Whitten and Tygar [16] conducted the first formal user study of a secure email system (i.e., PGP 5). They found serious usability issues with key management and users' understanding of the underlying public key cryptography. Subsequent studies have demonstrated that improved usability can be achieved with automatic key management [9, 13, 11, 1] .
Several studies have observed that hiding encryption details can impact usability. For example, a study by Garfinkel et al. [8] found that encryption "was a little too transparent" in how well it integrated with Outlook Express. Additionally, they found that some users failed to read the instructions associated with various visual indicators. Ruoti et al. [11] tested a secure email prototype that tightly integrates with Gmail. Even though results showed the system to be quite usable, they found that some users made mistakes and were hesitant to trust the system since the automatic encryption was too transparent.
There are two related works that directly inspired this paper. Fahl et al. [6] explored manual and automatic encryption in the design of a Facebook chat system. Their user study demonstrated that users preferred automatic key management, but found no significant difference between automatic and manual encryption. They raised the issue that transparency could impact users' feelings of trust and recommended the issue be addressed in future work. Ruoti et al. [11] conducted a study comparing Pwm to a desktop application (MP) that supported manual encryption. They found that participants using MP's manual encryption made fewer mistakes and answered more questions correctly on a quiz that tested their understanding of the system. Concurrent to our work, Atwater et al. [1] also conducted a replication of Ruoti et al.'s study. They created two version of a tool based on Mailvelope, and these versions only differed in their usage of manual and automatic encryption. They found that manual encryption had no statistically significant effect on participants' trust of their secure email system. Their work differs from ours in that they examined the question of trust whereas we are looking at understanding and mistakes, the two pivotal points from Ruoti et al.'s original work.
Atwater et al. claimed that they had succeeding in creating an automated-PGP system with SUS scores comparable to the scores given to Pwm in Ruoti et al.'s work; however, we have downloaded their data and determined that they made a error in their calculations. The actual SUS scores for their systems are lower than the results reported in Ruoti et al. and much lower than the scores reported in our paper. Moreover, the difference is statistically significant in both cases (two tailed student ttest, unequal variance -p < 0.01). Additionally, their Mailvelope-based systems did not accurately simulate requiring participants to wait for the recipient to setup Mailvelope before being able to send them encrypted email. These two problems calls into question their conclusion that users are ready to embrace automatic-PGP, but still, the work is promising, and hopefully future work will further refine what they have accomplished.
VALIDATING MANUAL ENCRYPTION
The goal of our research is to determine whether the use of manual encryption increases usability, improves understanding, and helps users avoid mistakes when sending secure email. More specifically, we are interested in determining whether these benefits exist in all cases or only when other usability issues are present, as in Ruoti et al.'s former work [11] . With this focus in mind, we form three sets of hypotheses:
Increased Usability H 0 Automatic and Manual encryption have similar usability.
H 1 Automatic and Manual encryption differ in their usability.
Improved Understanding
H 2 Automatic and Manual encryption do equally well at helping users understand secure email.
H 3 Manual encryption does better than automatic encryption at helping users understand secure email.
Helped Users Avoid Mistakes
H 4 Automatic and Manual encryption do equally well at helping users avoid mistakes.
H 5 Manual encryption does better than automatic encryption at helping users avoid mistakes.
Since this research is verifying the claims made by Ruoti et al., we decided to use their Private WebMail (Pwm) system to test our hypotheses. After obtaining the source code for Pwm, we modified it and created two versions: a version that uses automatic encryption and a version that uses manual encryption. Other than these two differences, the systems were otherwise identical. This allows us to conduct an A/B test that specifically examines the benefits of manual encryption as compared to automatic encryption.
The remainder of this section describes Pwm, explains the differences between the automatic and manual encryption versions of Pwm, and details other modifications we made to Pwm's interface to address usability issues that might otherwise have been confounding factors in our study. 
Private WebMail (Pwm)
Pwm implements secure email through tight integration with Gmail and automatic key management. When users read or compose secure email, Pwm replaces portions of Gmail's interface with Pwm's own secure interface. Pwm's interfaces are styled differently than Gmail's, providing a clear demarcation of which information is being protected by Pwm.
All secure email sent using Pwm includes instructions on how to setup Pwm for first-time users. The setup instructions direct new users to the Pwm website, where they are able to add a bookmarklet to their browser's bookmark storage. 1 The new user then returns to Gmail and clicks on the Pwm bookmarklet to run Pwm. The benefits of using a bookmarklet to run Pwm include not requiring installation permission on the machine and also avoiding any user worries related to installing extensions [11] . The drawback is that users are required to click on the Pwm bookmarklet each time they reopen Gmail.
When Pwm is running, secure email messages are automatically decrypted for users. The decrypted contents of the message are displayed in place of the instructions and ciphertext that were in the email message's body (see Figure 2) . Optionally, the sender of the message can also include a plaintext greeting with the encrypted email message. This message is shown to the user above the decrypted contents of the email message. Encrypted email messages in the user's inbox are marked as Encrypted (see Figure 1 ).
By default, Pwm does not encrypt all email sent by a user, but instead requires that they manually enable encryption on a per-message basis (see Figure 3) . Once enabled, Pwm replaces the compose interface with its own interface (see Figure 4) . It also annotates the to and subject fields to describe how Pwm handles these two fields. Finally, it adds an area where users can include a plaintext greeting that appears before the encrypted part of their email message.
Automatic and Manual Encryption
The automatic encryption version of Pwm encrypts and sends email as soon as the user clicks Send encrypted (see Figure 4 ). We created a manual encryption version that splits this operation into two distinct steps. In the first step, instead of clicking the Send encrypted button, the user instead clicks the Encrypt button. Upon doing so, the user's email message is encrypted, and both the instructions for decrypting the email message and the encrypted ciphertext are shown to the user inside Gmail's compose interface (see Figure 5 ). This allows the user to confirm that encryption has actually taken place. In the second step, the user then clicks Gmail's Send button to send the encrypted email.
Modifications to Pwm's Interface
Ruoti et al.'s work indicated that manual encryption improved users' understanding and helped them avoid mis- takes, but it also noted several issues with Pwm's design that might have contributed to these problems. To better isolate the benefits of manual encryption we have fixed these potentially confounding usability issues.
Delayed Encryption
One concern expressed by a significant portion of participants in the studies by Ruoti et al. was that Pwm encrypted email so quickly that they were unsure if it had really done anything. Also, participants indicated the encryption process was so transparent that they were unsure who could read their encrypted email message.
To address both of these problems we added an artificial delay after users click the Send encrypted or Encrypt buttons. For each email recipient, users are shown a message lasting 1.5 seconds that states the email is being encrypted for that user (e.g., "Encrypting for bob@gmail.com"). This helps users understand who will be able to read the encrypted email and also lets them feel that something substantial has happened during the encryption process. Because most email messages have a small number of recipients, this artificial delay does not significantly impact the overall email experience.
Compose Interface
In order to prevent the contents of users' drafts from being readable by Gmail, Pwm provides an encryptedmode compose interface, which is overlayed on top of Gmail's own interface when encryption is enabled. To better conform to the flow of composing email messages in Gmail (moving from top to bottom), we moved the button that enables encryption to the very top of Gmail's compose interface (see Figure 3 ).
When encryption is enabled, we modified the placeholder text for the recipients and subject fields, explaining how Pwm uses these two fields (see Figure 4 ). We also added informative text to the top of the compose interface to make clear the current email message's encryption status (see Figure 4 and Figure 5 ). Furthermore, in the automatic encryption version we modified Gmail's Send button to read Send unencrypted, to ensure that users knew that Gmail's messages are not encrypted by default. We did not make the same change for the manual encryption version as the same Send button is used to send both encrypted and unencrypted email messages.
Finally, we added functionality allowing users to compose plaintext greetings that are included with the encrypted email (see Figure 2 and Figure 4 ). Although Ruoti et al. mentioned this functionality, their interface had no place for users to compose greetings. We include the greeting as it can help engender trust in a new user that receives an encrypted email, giving them confidence to setup and use Pwm. It also provides context for encrypted email messages before they are decrypted.
Look and Feel
We designed a new website for helping users install Pwm.
3 This website was created using the Bootstrap Freelancer theme, 4 and has a more professional look and feel than the original Pwm website. Additionally, we standardized the look and feel of Pwm to use the same colors and styles as the website, giving a consistent experience to all Pwm-based user activity.
Tutorials
To improve the user experience, we also added tutorials to Pwm that appear the first time a user runs Pwm, reads an encrypted email, or composes an encrypted email. The tutorials are intended to help users understand how secure email through Pwm works. Participants have the option to skip the tutorials and watch them later.
The tutorials provide step-by-step instructions on how to use Pwm. Each step uses simple language and instructs about a single feature of Pwm (see Figure 6 ). Some tutorial steps require explicit action from users before they can move on to the next tutorial step, helping users internalize correct behavior (see Figure 7) .
Introduction
This tutorial is shown to users the first time they run Pwm. It informs users that Pwm will help protect their email and tells them how to identify whether Pwm is running.
Read
The first time users read an encrypted email message, they are shown this tutorial. The tutorial shows users how to identify an encrypted email, explains the plaintext greeting, and identifies which portions of the email . Tutorial waiting for action from the user message were encrypted. Additionally, it informs them that email messages encrypted with Pwm are provided authenticity and confidentiality (even from Gmail).
Compose
The first time users compose an email message while Pwm is running, they are given the option to watch a tutorial that teaches them the correct order of operations. It also informs them about who can read their message, the purpose of the optional greeting, and where to type sensitive information.
METHODOLOGY
This section gives an overview of an IRB-approved user study comparing automatic and manual encryption. It describes the scenario design, user tasks, study questionnaire, survey development, and limitations. The full details of the study and resulting data will be available upon publication.
Using the standard deviation reported by Ruoti et al., we conducted power analysis to determine samples sizes. We determined that fifty participants would be sufficient for supporting H 0 in cases where the SUS scores differed only moderately (≤ 10 points). Our power analysis also showed that to support H 2 and H 4 , we would be required to have unreasonably large sample sizes for this type of study (e.g., 774 total participants to detect a 10% difference). Thus, due to fact that the results for H 2 -H 5 are not statistically significant, we will instead focus our discussion on observed trends.
Study Setup
The study ran for two weeks (February 17, 2015 through March 3, 2015) and included 52 participants that were randomly assigned to test either the automatic or manual encryption version of Pwm. Participants took 30 to 60 minutes to complete the study and were compensated $10 USD for their efforts.
Studies were conducted in a room dedicated for this study. When participants first entered the room, they were read a brief introduction to the study. For the remainder of the study, all instructions were written and provided to them, either via a printed information sheet or via email. Participants completed all tasks on a virtual machine, ensuring that the computer started in the exact same state for all participants.
Two study coordinators were involved in the study. One coordinator sat in the same room as the participant and sat within the participant's peripheral vision. This coordinator was instructed to avoid prompting participants and to only assist participants if they had not made any progress within five minutes. The second coordinator sat in another room and corresponded with the participant over email as part of the study tasks.
Quality Control
We removed one participant from the results of the survey because their Gmail configuration did not work with Pwm, they interacted with the coordinators significantly more than any other participant in trying to address the problem, and they were the only participant to not use their own email address. We chose to discard this participant's results because these issues may have biased their responses. For the remainder of this work, we report results based on the 51 remaining participants.
Participant Demographics
We recruited Gmail users for our study at a local university. Participants were evenly split between genders: male (25; 49%), female (26; 51%). Participants skewed young: 18 -24 years old (45; 88%), 25 -34 years old (3; 6%), 35 -44 years old (2; 4%), 55 years or older (1; 2%).
We distributed posters broadly across campus to avoid biasing our results by any particular major. All participants were affiliated with the university, 5 with the overwhelming majority being undergraduate students: undergraduates (44; 86%), graduates (2; 4%), faculty and staff (5; 10%). Participants had a variety of majors, including both technical and non-technical majors. No major was represented by more than three participants, with the vast majority having only a single participant.
Participants were asked how often they logged into Gmail on the web. Most participants indicated they checked their email on the web many times a day: many times a day (39; 76%), once a day (3; 6%), 2 -3 times a week (2; 4%), once a week (2; 4%), 2 -3 times a month (2, 4%).
Scenario Design
During the course of the study, participants were given two scenarios to complete: being hired for a new job and sending credit card information to a spouse. 5 We did not require this affiliation.
Both of these scenarios were designed to simulate situations that participants could realistically imagine using secure email to complete. Participants completed tasks for the first scenario before beginning the second scenario. Prior to beginning each scenario, participants were provided with a written description of the scenario. This description included information that participants should send in place of their own personal information.
6
Participants were asked to treat this sensitive information with the same care as they would treat their own information.
1. Being hired for a new job. Participants were told that they had recently returned from an interview at National Citadel, a fictitious company created for this study. As part of this scenario they had to submit receipts in order to be reimbursed for travel expenses, accept an offer of employment, and complete several hiring tasks.
2. Sending credit card information to a spouse. In this scenario participants were told that their spouse had texted them asking for login information to a credit card website. Participants were also told that they wanted to send this information encrypted over email, but that their spouse had never before used secure email. Participants were asked to send their spouse the requested information, taking whatever steps they felt necessary to ensure their spouse could read the encrypted email.
Task Design
Based on the two scenarios, we designed several tasks according to two goals. First, we wanted to have realistic tasks that users could envision completing as part of the scenarios. Second, we wanted tasks that used as many email features as possible. Additionally, we designed the tasks without considering Pwm's feature set, as we wanted to avoid biasing the tasks to reflect favorably on Pwm.
Tasks were completed entirely using email, and participants used their own email accounts. Participants were presented with tasks sequentially. If participants accidentally sent sensitive information without encryption they were notified of their mistake in an email and asked to resend the information using encryption.
Being hired for a new job Task 1. Participants received an email from National Citadel containing instructions on how to be reimbursed for expenses from their recent interview. Participants were told to send their Social Security number and a picture of their receipts. They were informed that this information must be encrypted as per National Citadel's policies. This email also instructed users to set up and use Pwm to encrypt their email messages.
This task was designed to test whether participants were able to set up and use Pwm having only been provided with instructions that might be reasonably expected from a company requesting information to be encrypted.
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Task 2. Participants were first asked to close their browser and then reopen Gmail. They were informed that this simulated several weeks passing after the completion of task 1. Participants were then sent an encrypted email that contained an offer letter. They were asked to reply with their acceptance. They were also asked to CC their new manager.
This task was designed to test whether participants would remember how to enable Pwm. It also tested whether they could use Pwm to CC a new recipient.
Task 3. Participants were sent an email instructing them to email information to a background check company. They were instructed to encrypt the information.
This task was designed to test whether users could enable encryption, either by forwarding the request for information or by composing a new email message.
Task 4. Participants were instructed to send bank account information to National Citadel's payroll department. They were not reminded to encrypt this information.
This task was designed to test whether users would remember to encrypt information if they were not explicitly prompted to do so. Unlike the preceding tasks, if they sent information without encryption, we still considered this task complete.
Sending credit card information to a spouse Task 5. As described in the scenario, participants sent login information to their "spouse" using Pwm. It was left up to the user to decide how to best prepare their spouse for receiving their first Pwm message.
This task was designed to see how participants would induct a new person into using secure email. Regardless of what instructions were sent, we considered this task complete when the information had been sent.
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Task 6. Participants received another email from their spouse asking them for additional credit card information. This request was not encrypted and did not instruct the participant to send the additional credit card information encrypted.
This task was designed to test whether users would remember to encrypt information if they were not explicitly prompted to do so. Unlike most of the preceding tasks, if they sent information without encryption, we still considered this task complete.
To test hypotheses H 4 and H 5 , we measure the number of mistakes participants make while attempting these tasks.
Study Questionnaire
We administered our study using the Qualtrics webbased survey software. Before beginning the survey, participants were read an introduction by the study coordinator and asked to answer a set of demographic questions. Participants then completed the six study tasks, following which they were asked to complete a questionnaire regarding their experience.
To test hypotheses H 0 and H 1 regarding usability, we had participants complete the ten System Usability Scale (SUS) questions [4, 5] . Answers to these questions are used to derive each version's SUS score, a single numeric score from 0, the least usable, to 100, the most usable, that provides a rough estimate of the version's overall usability. Recent research has shown that SUS scores are effective for comparing systems across different study populations and is the usability statistic used in Ruoti et al.'s original work [11] . Moreover, Tullis and Stetson compared SUS to four other usability metrics (three standard metrics from the usability literature and their own proprietary measure) and determined that SUS gives the most reliable results [15] .
After completing the SUS questions, participants were asked several questions designed to ascertain whether they would want to use Pwm in their day-to-day lives. These included questions on whether they wanted to have all or only some of their email encrypted, whether they wanted to begin using Pwm, and whether they would feel comfortable using Pwm with their family and friends. Participants were also asked to describe what they liked about Pwm, what they would change about Pwm, and how Pwm could be more applicable to their own lives.
To test hypotheses H 2 and H 3 , we ask participants questions to examine how well they understood the cryptographic properties of Pwm. To test understanding of confidentiality, they were asked to indicate which parties could read a message encrypted with Pwm. Similarly, participants were asked whether Pwm provided authenticity and integrity for secure email messages composed with Pwm. Each question was asked in language that would be approachable to users and did not require a technical background. For each property, participants were given the option to indicate that they were unsure whether that property was provided by Pwm.
Survey Development
We began the design of our study before completing the implementation of Pwm. As mentioned earlier, we designed the study to test secure email first and Pwm second. This study development approach allows us to feel more confident that participants were interacting with Pwm in a realistic fashion. To help ensure that this goal was met, we included researchers who are not involved in our secure email research to help design the scenarios and tasks. After creating scenarios and tasks that were acceptable to all parties, we then conducted a pilot study with three participants. We did not identify any significant flaws during the pilot study.
Limitations
While our studies included students with a diverse set of majors and technical expertise, it would be beneficial for future studies to verify our results using non-student populations. Gmail users may also not be representative of the general population's preferences regarding secure email, and further studies should be conducted with users of other email systems.
Our study is short-term and is not necessarily representative of how participants would use secure email over a longer period of time. Once our implementation of Pwm has been proven to be sufficiently usable and secure in short-term studies, it is important that it then be analyzed in a more comprehensive long-term study. This could potentially reveal additional information about the advantages and disadvantages of manual encryption.
Our study is a lab study and has limitations common to all studies run in a trusted environment [10, 14] . While there are indications that some participants treated the provided sensitive information as they would their own (e.g., refusing to email the provided social security number), there is still no guarantee that participants' reactions mimic their real life behaviors. Additionally, our studies did not test participants' ability to resist attacks.
RESULTS
In this section we report the quantitative results from our user study. First, we report data related to our hypotheses. Second, we report other quantitative data related to participants' willingness to adopt secure email, preferences for how secure email is implemented, and prior experience using secure email.
Usability
We evaluated Pwm using the System Usability Scale (SUS). The automatic encryption version of Pwm had a SUS score of 79.1 and the manual encryption version had a SUS score of 81.1. Further breakdown of the SUS scores, along with SUS scores from Ruoti et al.'s earlier study, can be found in Table 1 . The difference between manual encryption was not statistically significant (two tailed student t-test, unequal variance -p = 0.43).
Based on these results, we fail to reject the null hypothesis H 0 for usability, and have sufficient power (β = 0.2) Figure 8 . to confirm that their true SUS scores fall within ten points of each other (though our observations suggest that the true difference is even smaller.)
To give greater context we leverage the work of several researchers. Bangor et al. [3] analyzed 2,324 SUS surveys, and derived a set of acceptability ranges that describe whether a system with a given score is acceptable to users in terms of usability. Bangor et al. also associated specific SUS scores with adjective descriptions of the system's usability. Using this data, we generated ranges for these adjective ratings, such that a score is correlated with the adjective it is closest to in terms of standard deviations. Sauro et al. [12] also analyzed SUS scores from Bangor et al. [2] , Tullis et al. [15] , and their own data. They calculate the percentile values for SUS scores and assign letter grades based on percentile ranges. The above contextual clues are presented in Figure 8 .
Using this context, Pwm's SUS score of 80.0 is rated as having "excellent" usability and given an "A" grade. It falls between the 85 th and 90 th percentile. We used Ruoti et al.'s SUS results from their earlier studies and calculated that their implementation of Pwm had an average SUS score of 74.2. This score is rated as having "good" usability, given a "B" grade, and falls between the 70 th and 80 th percentile. The difference between our implementation and that of Ruoti et al. is statistically significant (two tailed student t-test, unequal variancep < 0.01). We also compared our results against those of the automatic encryption tool developed by Atwater et al. [1] , which had a SUS score of 65.4.
9 Their score is rated as having "good" usability, given a "C" grade, and falls between the 40 th and 60 th percentile. The difference between our system and that of Atwater et al. is statistically significant (two tailed student t-test, unequal variance -p < 0.01).
Understanding
We asked three questions to determine whether each participant understood the confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity properties provided by Pwm. The responses indicated whether each participant correctly understood the principle, had some misunderstanding, or was unsure. Table 2 summarizes these results.
In all three cases, the difference between manual and automatic encryption was minute. Both understanding of confidentiality and authenticity are approximately the same value. While integrity is slightly higher for manual encryption, it is difficult to read too much into this small difference. Based on the results, we believe it is unlikely that the alternative hypothesis H 3 is true to any meaningful degree. It is interesting that even with tutorials that explicitly instruct participants on these three cryptographic properties, there are still a small number of participants who were unsure how their messages were protected. This indicates that more work needs to be done to determine how to effectively teach users about these properties.
Avoiding Mistakes
During the study, we recorded all instances of a participant taking an action that deviated from the study parameters. Using this data, we identified several instances where a participant's actions leaked sensitive information. These results are reported by task in Table 3 .
During the study, two participants sent sensitive information without ever running Pwm, and another refreshed the Gmail page but did not restart Pwm before sending sensitive information. In all three cases, the mistakes were caused by the misuse of the tool and occurred before participants had ever seen any differences in the two version of Pwm. For this reason, they are reported in the overall number of mistakes, but not under automatic or manual encryption.
Overall the rate of mistakes was extremely low (2%, 6 tasks out of 306). With so little evidence of mistakes, regardless of the system used, there doesn't seem to be any meaningful difference between manual and automatic encryption. Based on the results, it is highly unlikely that the alternative hypothesis H 5 is true to any meaningful degree.
DISCUSSION
In this section we begin with a discussion of automatic and manual encryption. We follow this by discussing participant experiences, opinions, and preferences regarding secure email. Finally, we detail lessons learned about our implementation of Pwm.
In this section, participants are referred to as R1 -R52, with the number corresponding to the order in which they participated in our study.
Automatic and Manual Encryption
For each set of hypotheses, we failed to reject the null hypothesis. This indicates that by adding additional features to automatic encryption (e.g., tutorials, delayed encryption, improved task flow) we are able to replicate the benefits of manual encryption. Additionally, several participants who used the manual encryption were surprised that their messages were not automatically sent. R8 and R29 stated, respectively, "[...] I had to click to encrypt it and then click to send. I liked the thought of it being one action."
"The one thing I would change is the interface of the email after you click encrypt. The first time I encrypted a message, it seemed to disappear. I wasn't sure if it had been sent until I realized that I had to click the send button. I think you could improve this if you made a big blue or green bar in the email that said,"This contains your encrypted message" and then if you clicked on it you could see what you wrote. "
Still, this is not an indictment of manual encryption. Our results demonstrate that manual encryption does not negatively impact usability, user understanding, or mistake avoidance. While other features were able to provide the same benefits as manual encryption, we still believe that manual encryption is a valid approach for system designers.
Acceptability of Pwm
Even though more than half of the participants rejected the idea of encrypting all of their email, every single participant was interested in encrypting their sensitive email. All but nine participants wanted to start using Pwm, and participants overwhelmingly believed they could use Pwm with their friends and family.
Participants consistently reported a positive experience with Pwm. For example, R26, R39, and R42 expressed, respectively, "Pwm was very simple, but definitely carried a [sic] aura of confidence in actually protecting your information. Now, how well it does is something that I cannot determine due to my lack of knowledge, but it was very well put together. It was very concise and user friendly and did not require esoteric knowledge to operate. I would definitely feel more comfortable sending sensitive information over email if I were using Pwm versus just sending it via an email provider." "I liked how I could encrypt sensitive information like bank account information, credit card, and other things. It wasn't that hard to use. I didn't have to download anything; all I had to do was just save a bookmark and then click on it. It was really easy to use." "I liked how it made encrypting important information so easy. The tutorial was fast and easy. I like that it is easy and convenient to use with day to day emails. I liked that the background was blue so I knew when it was encrypting."
The positive responses and achieving the highest SUS score for a secure email system reported in the literature are evidence that the implementation of Pwm may be usable enough for widespread adoption. This indicates we have reached a point of diminishing returns for further short-term lab studies, and it is time to measure how well Pwm fares in a long-term study.
Mixed mode email
The optional plaintext greeting that can accompany email encrypted by Pwm is intended to help email senders give confidence to recipients who have never used Pwm that the email is authentic and not spam. Surprisingly, during our study we noted that a small, but significant number of users would include a plaintext greeting in many of their encrypted email messages. For example, in Task 4 eight participants (8; 16%) including a greeting stating that they were sending their direct deposit information. Interestingly, this was actually a feature that seven participants (7; 14%) listed as one of their favorite features of Pwm. R12 and R51 stated, respectively, "That is lets me chose when to encrypt and when not to. It's also nice to have the option of writing a message before the encrypted part so others know it's not spam."
Lessons Learned
The following are lessons we learned about our implementation of Pwm during the study.
Instructing New Users
Even though Pwm automatically inserts instructions on how to setup and use Pwm in every encrypted message, most participants were unaware of this. During Task 5, participants would often spend several minutes trying to open an old Pwm message to grab the instructions, only to have the message immediately decrypted and the instructions disappear. It would be helpful to make it more clear that these instructions are always included or to add an option that allows users to explicitly add these instructions.
Look and Feel
Quite a few participants indicated enjoying the look and feel of Pwm. They also indicated that having a colorscheme that was distinct from Gmail helped them more easily understand what information was encrypted and what information was in the clear. This intuitive understanding potentially helped participants avoid mistakenly entering sensitive information where it would not be protected. Additionally, participants mentioned that it helped them feel more confident in the system. Thus it is clear that when designing tightly integrated systems, it is important to have a distinct look and feel.
Tutorials
We recorded the number of participants that completed each tutorial. The video recording for one participant's session was corrupted, and we were unable to determine if they had completed the tutorials. The results of the remaining 50 participants demonstrate that participants were willing to watch tutorials: watched introductory tutorial (46; 92%), watched tutorial on reading secure email (46; 92%), watched the tutorial on composing secure email (27; 54%). This is in stark contrast to Ruoti et al.'s study where nearly all participants ignored a tutorial video that was displayed next to the setup instructions on Pwm's website [11] .
This result indicates that participants are willing to watch tutorials, though two criteria seem to be crucial: they appear in-page as participants need them and they contain simple and direct wording.
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CONCLUSION
We examined the open question on how manual encryption affects the usability of secure email. Based on this question, we formulated three hypotheses that examined how automatic and manual encryption differed in terms of usability, users' understanding of secure email, and users' ability to avoid mistakes, respectively. We then tested our hypotheses by conducting an A/B test using two versions of the Private WebMail (Pwm) system [11] that differed only in their support for automatic and manual encryption.
Our results demonstrate that after accounting for confounding usability problems, manual encryption does not have a significant effect on usability, users' understanding of secure email, or users' ability to avoid mistakes. In addition, our improved version of Pwm scores an 80.0 on the System Usability Scale (SUS), rating in the "excellent" category for usability and receiving an "A" grade. This score is in the 85 th to 90 th percentile of a large number of systems tested with SUS [12] and is the highest SUS score ever recorded in the literature for a secure email tool.
